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Throughout the world, welfare recipients are faced with the obligation to work in ex-
change for the cash bene…ts they receive. This combination of paying welfare bene…ts and
demanding a work e¤ort has been coined “workfare”. Considering that in many cases the
output in such programs has been quite low, many countries have refrained from actually
using workfare. However, enforcing the work requirement on a large scale constitutes
one of the core elements of the US welfare reform in the last decade (see the surveys by
Ellwood, 2000, Haveman and Wolfe, 2000, Blank, 2002, and Mo¢tt, 2002). Interestingly,
the number of welfare recipients in the US has fallen drastically in the last fewyears (Hotz
et al., 2002).
Our paper addresses the impacts of introducing and enforcing workfare institutions on
employment, wages, pro…ts, and utility levels of both employed and unemployed workers.
A framework of involuntary unemployment is chosen in which the e¤ects of workfare are
independent of behavioral changes of welfare recipients. If jobs were available, welfare
recipients would reduce their reservation wage when being asked to enter a workfare
program, causing an increase in employment. In our setting, labor demand reacts to the
changes of the incentive structure of the employed, who perceive the risk of a dismissal
as a more severe threat. Forward-looking welfare recipients may be compensated for the
required work e¤ort by better job opportunities.
We analyze an e¢ciency wage model in which workers can choose to shirk. For sim-
plicity, all unemployed are taken to be welfare recipients, and bene…ts are …nanced by a
proportional income tax. A representative …rm chooses its monitoring intensity at the
workplace, that is, the share of workers engaged in supervising their co-workers. The
workfare program itself may also be associated with a monitoring cost for ensuring that
the participants do not shirk. All individuals are identical with respect to abilities and
preferences.
Strengthening the work requirement for welfare recipients will increase both employ-
ment and the monitoring intensity, and generally lowers both taxes and wages. As being
unemployed becomes more uncomfortable, wages can be reduced, increasing the demand
for labor and reducing the opportunity cost of monitoring. Taxes then go down along
with a declining welfare caseload. Pro…ts will increase with more productive employment,
1while the impact on net wages is ambiguous. Expected lifetime utility levels of employed
and unemployed may increase even if the net wage falls. The unemployed lose according
to their increased disutility of labor, while they bene…t through improved job opportuni-
ties. The chances to re-enter employment are further increased due to the fact that the
higher monitoring intensity within …rms diminishes the rent of employed workers, thus
inducing an additional wage cut. The smaller utility di¤erential reduces losses arising
from exogenous splits of employment relationships. The results indicate that imposing
workfare can even lead to a Pareto improvement.
The theoretical literature on workfare programs has extensively dealt with screening
issues. Workfare has been justi…ed with the objective to achieve a minimum utility level
or a minimum income of social assistance recipients by Dye and Antle (1986), Blacko-
rby and Donaldson (1988), and Besley and Coate (1992). Further, Chambers (1989),
Besley and Coate (1995), Brett (1998) and Cu¤ (2000) have explored the e¢ciency prop-
erties of workfare designs under voluntary unemployment within an optimum income tax
framework. The basic idea is that individuals with high earnings capacities are deterred
from taking up bene…ts. In a dynamic perspective, the less comfortable treatment of the
unemployed creates an incentive to acquire human capital.
The consequences of workfare on the participants are subject to disputes. While Coate
(1995) stressesthat the work requirement may reduce future welfaredependency, Peck and
Theodore (2000) argue that human capital losses arise if training is crowded out by the
work requirement. A public-choice argument for the widespread acceptance of workfare
rules has beeno¤ered by Mo¢tt (1999). Combining ahigh incomeof the poor with a work
requirement may simply re‡ect the preferences of the political majority. These voters will
then be willing to …nance unproductive workfare programs.
Surprisingly little has been said about welfare e¤ects in a general equilibrium context.
Solow (1998) stresses that measures reducing the well-being of welfare recipients will usu-
ally lead to an increase in employment. However, he suspects that low-skilledworkers will
be the losers of such reforms due to falling wages. Schöb (2003) arrives at similar results
for a scenario where a monopolistic union sets the wage rate. Within a matching model,
Fredriksson and Holmlund (2003) con…rm the argument of Thustrup Kreiner and Tranæs
(2005), stating that workfare can bring about a Pareto improvement by screening the
voluntarily unemployed and allowing for an increase in the replacement rate in unemploy-
2ment insurance. In their view, the drawback of workfare vis-à-vis the introduction of time
limits or a stricter monitoring of search activities lies in that it provides little incentives
for job search. Meier (2002) shows for a shirking model with exogenous monitoring that
net wages and lifetime utilities of employed and unemployed workers all move into the
same direction. Hence, it is not obvious that workfare a¤ects employed and unemployed
workers asymmetrically.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After introducing the model in
section 2, section3 analyzes the problems ofexistence and stability of equilibria. Compar-
ative static results are derived in section 4. Section 5 discusses the results and indicates
directions for future research.
2 The Model
The model is basedon ShapiroandStiglitz (1984). Weconsider N identical workers whose
preferences are described by the utility function U(!;") = ! ¡ ", where ! denotes the
monetary compensation and " is the e¤ort exerted at the workplace. With probability b
per unit of time, an employment relationship breaks down for exogenous reasons. Workers
are in…nitely lived and maximize W = E
R 1
0 U(!(s);"(s))exp(¡rs)ds; where s denotes
time, r > 0 is the discount rate, and E represents the expectations operator. Employed
workers can either shirk (e = 0) or choose the expected e¤ort level (e = 1). Workers
who shirk are detected with probability q per unit of time. Detected shirkers are laid o¤
immediately.
The unemployed have to participate in a workfare program in order to receive the
bene…t w > 0. We disregard the possibility that some of the unemployed may prefer a
cut of the bene…t even if it goes down to zero. The net cost of monitoring a participant to
prevent him from shirking, accounting for a possible positive value of the output, is given
by m: The study of Haveman and Wolfe (2000), reporting strong increases in monthly
cost per family uponintroducingthe workfare program inWisconsin, indicates substantial
costs of organizing public jobs and enforcing the work obligation. The disutility of work
required in the program is re‡ected by the e¤ort eu. Recalling that in real world programs
the unemployed can choose to opt out, we assume that eu · e, that is, the e¤ort required
in the workfare program does never exceed the e¤ort required at the workplace. Welfare
3bene…ts are …nanced by a proportional income tax with t denoting the tax rate. The net




E , and Vu denote expected lifetime utility of an employed shirker, employed
non-shirker, and unemployed individual, respectively. The asset equations for shirkers
and non-shirkers are given by
rV S




E = (1¡ t)w ¡ e +b(Vu ¡ V N
E ): (2)
These equations state that the return in each period is equal to the sum of the ‡ow
bene…t and the expected change of the value of the asset. An employed worker will not
shirk if V S
E · V N
E ; being equivalent to the no-shirking condition
(1¡ t)w ¸ rVu +
(r + b+ q)e
q
: (3)
The representative …rm produces under decreasing returns. Its output is given by
Q = F(LP) where LP denotes the number of employed production workers who are not
shirking. The production function satis…es F0(LP) > 0;F00(LP) < 0 and F0(N) > e. The
last property implies that full employment would be e¢cient.
An unemployed worker always participates in the workfare program. He gets a new
job with probability ® per unit of time. The asset equation of an unemployed worker is
given by
rVu = w ¡ eu + ®(VE ¡ Vu) (4)






: If not shirking at the workplace is optimal, (2) and (4) can
be solved. We obtain
VE ¡ Vu =
(1¡ t)w ¡ w ¡ (e ¡ eu)
r +® + b
; (5)
rVu = w ¡ eu+ ®
(1¡ t)w ¡ w ¡ (e ¡ eu)
r +® + b
; (6)
rVE = (1 ¡ t)w ¡ e ¡ b
(1 ¡ t)w ¡ w ¡ (e¡ eu)
r + ®+ b
: (7)
4Inserting (6) into the no-shirking condition yields
(1 ¡ t)w ¸ w + e ¡ eu +
r + ®+ b
q
e: (8)
Inducing workers not to shirk requires a higher wage w if either the welfare bene…t w gets
higher, the rate of exogenous splits b increases, the rate of obtaining a new job ® goes
up, the tax rate t increases, the rate of time preference r rises or the quality of shirking
detection, as measured by q, falls. The inequality (8) indicates that (1¡t)w¡e > w¡eu
must hold to deter shirking. By (6) and (7), employed workers have a higher expected
remaininglifetimeutility thanthose whoareunemployedatany givenpointintime. Thus,
unemployment is involuntary. Employedworkersearn the information rent r + ® +b
q edue
to the fact that the shirking detection technology is imperfect, that is, q is …nite.
The detectiontechnology is endogenizedas follows. Let LS denotethe number of work-
ers who are engaged in monitoring. The number of productive workers is LP = L¡ LS,
and L is total employment. The shirking detection rate q depends on the share of mon-
itoring labor at the workplace. Thus, q = H(¾), with ¾ := LS
L , where the detection
function H exhibits diminishing returns (H0 > 0; H00 < 0) and satis…es the Inada con-
ditions, lim¾!0H0 = 1 and lim¾!1H0 = 0. Monitoring workers and productive workers
receive the same wage, and monitoring workers control each other. Their shirking decision
is identical to the shirking decision of productive workers. The …rm maximizes net pro…ts
subject to the no-shirking condition. The Lagrangian is given by
¤ = (1¡ t)[F((1¡ ¾)L) ¡ wL] + ¸
·
(1¡ t)w ¡ w ¡ e + eu ¡





with ¸ denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with the no-shirking constraint. Op-
timizing with respect to total employment L, the monitoring intensity ¾, the gross wage
w, and ¸ yields the …rst-order conditions
@¤
@L
= (1¡ t)[(1¡ ¾)F
0 ¡ w] = 0; (9)
@¤
@¾
= ¡(1 ¡ t)LF
0 + ¸e
r + ®+ b
[H(¾)]2 H
0 = 0; (10)
@¤
@w
= ¡(1 ¡ t)L+ ¸(1 ¡ t) = 0; (11)
@¤
@¸
= (1¡ t)w ¡ w ¡ e +eu¡
r + ®+ b
H(¾)
e = 0: (12)
5The optimality conditions can be interpreted as follows. Equation (9) states that addi-
tional workers will be hired until the marginal productivity of labor, corrected for losses
through unproductive monitoring, is equal to the gross wage. According to (10), a higher
monitoring intensity is associated with a pro…t reduction of (1 ¡ t)LF0 because more
labor becomes unproductive. On the other hand, as indicated by ¸er + ®+ b
[H(¾)]2 H0, the
no-shirking constraint is no longer binding. This can be exploited to increase pro…ts by
cutting the wage. Last, a higher wage directly increases labor costs. Again, the …rm
bene…ts according to ¸(1 ¡ t) because the no-shirking constraint is no longer binding.
This e¤ect could be used to raise pro…ts by reducing the monitoring intensity. It is easy
to see that, with the employment level and monitoring intensity being given, the wage
will be chosen so as to satisfy the no-shirking condition with equality. From the …rm’s
perspective, the tax rate t and the reemployment rate ® represent parameters. Lemma 1
shows that the …rm’s optimization problem has a unique solution.
Lemma 1 At a given tax rate t and reemployment rate ®, an optimumvector (¾¤;L¤;w¤) >
0, consisting of monitoring intensity ¾¤, employment L¤; and wage w¤; exists and is
unique.
Proof. See Appendix A. ¤
In equilibrium, the number of entries into unemployment is equal to the number of
exits:
®(N ¡ L) = bL: (13)
Substituting for ® in the no-shirking condition leads to










u = N ¡ L
N representing the unemployment rate. At L = 0, the right-hand side of (14) is
equal to w ¡ eu+ r +b+ q
q e. It increases in L and goes to in…nity if L ! N.
If workers do not shirk, the representative …rm will set its labor input to the point
where the marginal product of labor, corrected for losses through monitoring, is equal
to the gross wage, that is, w = (1 ¡ ¾)F0((1 ¡ ¾)L). Utilizing this relationship and the
government budget equation
tF((1¡ ¾)L) = (w + m)(N ¡L) (15)
6implies that feasible allocations require
(1¡ t)w = (1 ¡ ¾)F0((1 ¡ ¾)L)(1¡
w +m
F((1 ¡¾)L)
(N ¡ L)): (16)
Note that the right-hand side of (16) is equal to F 0((1 ¡ ¾)N) > 0 if L = N. Moreover,
provided that F(0) = 0, an employment level L0 2 (0;N) exists which satis…es (1 ¡
w + m
F((1¡ ¾)L)(N ¡ L)) = 0.
All relevant decisions are taken simultaneously. The government always adjusts the
tax rateinstantaneously soas to balanceits budget. The …rm generally takes as givenboth
the wage and the tax rate, and chooses the employment level andthe monitoring intensity
so as to maximize pro…ts. However, the …rm accepts underbidding by unemployed workers
if net wages are higher than necessary to satisfy the no-shirking constraint. Conversely,
should the net wage be too low to prevent shirking, the …rm will increase the gross wage.
Taking as given wages, policy variables, and the unemployment rate, employed workers
choose whether or not to shirk.
3 Equilibria and Stability
The model can be simpli…ed to a system of two equations for ¾ and L. Combining the
…rst-order condition for the optimum monitoring intensity, (10), with the labor market
equilibrium condition (13) and the budget equation (15), where the Lagrange multiplier
can be derived from (11), yields
f1 = ¡(1¡
(w + m)(N ¡ L)
F((1¡ ¾)L)
)F0((1¡ ¾)L) +e
r + b N
N ¡ L
[H(¾)]
2 H0(¾) = 0: (17)
Equation f1 de…nes a relation ¾(L) which can exist for some L in the range (Lmin;N),
where Lmin is the minimum feasible employment where welfare bene…ts can be …nanced,
thatis, F(Lmin) = (w+m)(N¡Lmin). The …rst term, ¡(1¡(w + m)(N ¡ L)
F((1¡ ¾)L) )F 0((1¡¾)L),
represents the reduction in net pro…ts through the marginal cost per employed worker





is the corresponding marginal bene…t in a labor market equilibrium. In general, we
have lim¾!0f1 = 1 and lim¾!¾max f1 > 0, with ¾max denoting the maximum monitoring
7intensity being feasible, that is, (w + m)(N ¡ L)
F((1 ¡ ¾max)L) = 1. Ignoring the possibility of atangent
point, there are usually at least two solutions for ¾ that satisfy f1(¾;L) = 0. In Figure
1, the equilibrium monitoring intensity ¾1 is stable, while ¾2 is unstable. For monitoring
intensities close to the equilibrium values, the marginal bene…t exceeds the marginal cost
if ¾ < ¾1, implying that there is a tendency to increase the monitoring intensity, and
vice versa. A stable equilibrium monitoring intensity requires that f1¾ · 0 holds at any









Fig. 1. Stable and unstable monitoring intensity
Combining the input rule (9) with the no-shirking condition (12), the labor market
equilibrium condition (13), and the budget equation (15) gives us








¡w ¡e + eu ¡





Equation f2 describes a relation L(¾) that generally exists in some range (0;¾max), where
¾max is de…ned as above. The …rst term, (1¡¾)F 0((1¡¾)L)
·
1 ¡ w + m
F((1 ¡ ¾)L)(N ¡ L)
¸
,
8represents the marginal net revenue from increasing employment. In a labor market
equilibrium, the remaining terms, ¡w ¡ e + eu ¡
r +b N
N ¡ L
H(¾) e, are equal to ¡(1 ¡ t)w,
that is, the corresponding net marginal cost. Note that limL!Lmin f2 < 0 andlimL!N f2 =
¡1. Neglecting again the possibility of a tangent point, at least two solutions for L exist
that satisfy f2(¾;L) = 0. In Figure 2, the low equilibrium employment L1 is unstable,
while the high equilibrium employment L2 is stable. For employment levels close to the
equilibrium, we see that marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost if L < L2, implying
that there is a tendency to increase employment, and vice versa. A stable equilibrium








Fig. 2. Stable and unstable equilibrium employment
An equilibrium is a vector (¾;L) that satis…es both (17) and (18). The dynamics of
the monitoring intensity and aggregate employment is described by
_ ¾ = h1(f1(¾;L)); (19)
_ L = h2(f2(¾;L)); (20)
with h1(0) = h2(0) = 0, h0
1 > 0, and h0
2 > 0. Thus, …rms increase the monitoring intensity
or employment, respectively, if the marginal bene…t outweighs the marginal cost.
9Taking these pieces together, Figure 3 shows a typical situationthat may emerge. The
upper branch of the f1 = 0 curve is related to unstable equilibrium monitoring intensities
and the left branch of the f2 = 0 curve represents unstable equilibrium employment
levels. Among the four vectors of monitoring intensity and employment that satisfy both




















Fig. 3. Stable and unstable branches
In the following, we con…ne our attention to the stable branches and, therefore, treat
both ¾(L) and L(¾) as functions, corresponding to the equilibrium conditions f1 and f2.
Lemma2 demonstrates that athird condition has to besatis…ed toensurelocal asymptotic
stability.
Lemma 2 An equilibrium (¾;L) islocallyasymptotically stable only if f1¾f2L¡f1Lf2¾ ¸ 0
holds at (¾;L).










































Fig. 5. Stable and unstable equilibria (ii)
11It should be notedthat all equilibriasatisfyingf1¾ < 0, f2L < 0andf1¾f2L¡f1Lf2¾ ¸ 0
are locally asymptotically stable. Further, if the equilibrium based on stable branches is
unique, it will also be stable. In Figures 4 and 5, the equilibria (¾1;L1) and (¾3;L3) are
locally stable, whereas this is not the case for the equilibrium (¾2;L2).
4 Comparative statics
Assumingthata unique stable equilibrium (¾;L) exists, wecannowinvestigate the impact
of a change in the work requirement eu on the endogenous variables. Our analysis starts
by considering the e¤ects that arise at the micro level, neglecting repercussions on the
reemployment rate ® and the tax rate t. For given macro variables, the reactions of the
…rm to a stricter work requirement in the workfare program are described in Proposition
1.
Proposition 1 At a given tax rate t and reemployment rate ®, a stricterwork requirement
in the workfare program eu induces the representative …rm to increase the monitoring
intensity ¾, total employment L, and productive employment (1 ¡ ¾)L, while the wage w
is reduced.
Proof. See Appendix C. ¤
With astricter work requirement, the no-shirking constraint is no longer binding. This
enables the …rm to reduce the wage and to hire more labor. At a given marginal produc-
tivity of labor utilized for production (“productive labor”), the higher employment level
raises both the marginal cost and the marginal bene…t of an increase in the monitoring
intensity. These two e¤ects just o¤set eachother. At the sametime, the wage cut re‡ected
in the smaller marginal productivity of productive labor decreases the opportunity cost
of monitoring. Therefore it pays to raise the monitoring intensity. In the new optimum,
employment of productive labor will be higher because otherwise the incentive to raise
the monitoring intensity would not exist.
Noting that the direct reactions create more jobs and decrease the number of welfare
recipients, the reemployment rate will increase and the tax rate will fall. The reactions
of the …rm to changes in these parameters are summarized in Proposition 2.
12Proposition 2 At a given tax rate t, the representative …rm reacts to an increasing
reemployment rate ® by increasing both the control intensity ¾ and the gross wage w, and
by reducing productive employment (1¡ ¾)L. At a given job acquisition rate ®, a lower
tax rate t induces the …rm to decrease the gross wage w and to raise employment L, while
keeping both the monitoring intensity ¾ and the net wage (1¡ t)w constant.
Proof. See Appendix D. ¤
A higher job acquisition rate increases the marginal bene…t of monitoring due to a
stronger incentive to shirk. This e¤ect works in favor of raising the monitoring intensity.
The wage rate will also rise in order to satisfy the no-shirking condition again. The
higher wage rate increases the cost of labor, while the higher monitoring intensity is
associated with productivity losses. Pro…t maximization then requires a higher marginal
productivity of productive labor, which can only be achieved by employing a smaller
number of productive workers.
A falling tax rate reduces the incentive to shirk. This creates a pressure on the wage
rate and the monitoring intensity. At the same time, the loss of net revenue that arises
through monitoring becomes larger, again implying a tendency towards less monitoring.
Thefallingcost oflabor induces the …rmto hiremore workers. Recallingthe interpretation
of Proposition 1, the net e¤ect of a higher employment level on the monitoring intensity
is positive. It turns out that incentives are restored by cutting the wage and keeping the
monitoring intensity constant. The reduction of the marginal productivity of productive
labor due its higher utilization just o¤sets the falling tax rate. Since the opportunity
cost of increasing the monitoring intensity remains constant, the various impacts on the
monitoring intensity are neutralized.
We proceed by investigating the impact of a stricter work requirement in the workfare
program in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 A higher disutility of participants in the workfare program, eu, increases
both employment L and the monitoring intensity¾. The lifetime utility di¤erential between
employed and unemployed workers, VE ¡ Vu, shrinks.
Proof. See Appendix E. ¤
13The results are easily understood based on Propositions 1 and 2. Due to the stricter
work requirement for welfare recipients, the no-shirking condition is no longer binding.
Firms respond by reducing the gross wage and by hiring more labor. Since the net im-
pact on the opportunity cost of monitoring is negative, it turns out to be pro…table to
increase the monitoring intensity. With higher labor demand and a smaller number of
welfare recipients, the tax rate goes down and the chances of obtaining a job are improved.
The falling tax rate yields a further increase in employment, while keeping the monitor-
ing intensity una¤ected. The falling unemployment rate again drives up the optimum
monitoring intensity. Hence, the impact on the monitoring intensity is unambiguously
positive.
In contrast to Meier (2002), there is a distributive impact on workers in terms of
absolute lifetime utility di¤erentials. The utility di¤erential shrinks due to the rising
monitoring intensity, reducing the information rent of employed workers.
We show in Appendix F that productive employment may change in either direction.
As we view a potential decline as being quite implausible, we consider an increasing level
of productive employment as the typical reaction in the following. Hence, we assume that
the reduction in productive employment is never strong enough to o¤set, or even revert,
the increases that occur (i) as a direct reaction to a stricter work requirement for welfare
recipients and (ii) due to the fall of the tax rate.
The gross wage w = (1 ¡ ¾)F0((1 ¡ ¾)L) will obviously always fall if productive
employment does not decrease. Pro…ts can be written as
¼ = F((1¡ ¾)L) ¡ L(1 ¡ ¾)F
0((1 ¡¾)L): (21)
They increase if and only if productive employment goes up,
@¼
@(1¡ ¾)L
= ¡(1 ¡ ¾)LF00((1¡ ¾)L) > 0: (22)















The tax rate will generally fall due to both a smaller number of welfare recipients and a
higher total output. The latter is a consequence of the increasing productive labor input.























The change in the net wage is ambiguous in sign. While the combination of a higher
monitoring intensity and a rising level of productive employment contributes to a falling
gross wage, the tax cut works in the opposite direction. The positive impact of rising
employment on the net wage in equation (24) only captures the consequences of a higher
reemployment rate. The ambiguity result is obvious when considering a scenario in which
the monitoring intensity is almost …xed. This may happen if there is a kink or some
similar structure in the function H at the equilibrium monitoring intensity. When the
program cost per unemployed worker w + m is su¢ciently small, say zero, the reduction
of the gross wage due to a higher utilization of productive labor must be the dominating
e¤ect. By contrast, when the program cost w + m is substantial, while the elasticity of
the marginal product of labor with respect to labor input is close to zero, the tax cut will
induce a rising net wage.



























It can easily be seen that both utility measures increase if the net wage remains constant.
Lifetime utility of an employed worker can rise even if the net wage declines because the
loss in utility triggered by a breakdown of the employment relationship falls.
5 Conclusions
It has been shown that introducing a workfare program bears the potential for a Pareto
improvement. It increases employment and will generally raise pro…ts and reduce gross
15wages. Productive employment usually increases as well as unproductive monitoring. The
latter reduces the rent of employed workers, improving the chances of the unemployed to
get a job. Interestingly, the unemployed would be the winners of the reform in terms of
absolute utility di¤erentials. Since the tax rate falls due to a higher output and a smaller
number of unemployed, the net wage may move in either direction. A constant net wage
would already be su¢cient to achieve a higher expected lifetime utility for everybody.
These results may explain why workfare experiments have become more popular during
the last years.
Our model may be too optimistic with respect tothe employability of the unemployed.
Usually, welfare recipients display less favorable labor market characteristics than short-
term unemployed and show a substantially smaller exit rate into employment. It may
therefore be the case that workfare for welfare recipients a¤ects the unemployed in an
asymmetric fashion. The impact on lifetime utility will then be positive for the short-
term unemployed, while it is negative for some groups of the long-term unemployed who
are subjected to the workfare rule but still have only small chances of regaining employ-
ment. Therefore, introducing workfare measures without screening the candidates before
imposing the work requirement should typically harm some of the poorest individuals.
16Appendix
A: Proof of Lemma 1





r + ®+ b
[H(¾)]2 H0 = 0: (27)
Substituting for (1 ¡ t)w from (12) then implies
ª(¾) = ¡




r + ® +b
[H(¾)]2 H0 (28)
= e










w + e ¡ eu
1¡ ¾
= 0:
Note that lim¾!0ª(¾) = 1, lim¾!1ª(¾) = ¡1, and
ª
0(¾) = ¡
w + e¡ eu
(1 ¡ ¾)
2 ¡ e




















































Any candidate ¾¤ that satis…es ª(¾) = 0 then has the property
ª
0(¾) = e









Thus, an interior solution for the optimum control intensity ¾ exists, and it is unique.
The no-shirking condition (12) then uniquely determines the related gross wage w. Last,
at a given ¾ and w, the input rule (9) uniquely determines employment: ¤
17B: Proof of Lemma 2
Recalling that a locally stable equilibrium requires both f1¾ · 0 and f2L · 0, the in-
equality f1¾f2L ¡ f1Lf2¾ ¸ 0 can be violated only if sgn[f1L] = sgn[f2¾]. Suppose that
f1¾f2L < f1Lf2¾.













< 0: Such a situation corresponds to an equilibrium
which is only saddle-path stable, but not locally asymptotically stable (see, for example,
the equilibrium (¾2;L2) in Figure 4).













> 0: Again, the equilibrium is only
saddle-path stable, butnot locally asymptotically stable(see, for example, the equilibrium
(¾2;L2) in Figure 5). ¤
C: Proof of Proposition 1













Note that L can be eliminated from (10) by substituting for ¸ from (11). Applying the




(1¡ t)LF 00 + e(r + ®+ b)HH00 ¡ 2H(H0)2
H3
(1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ ¾)F00 > 0: (32)
Moreover, we arrive at
@(1¡ ¾)L
@¾





e(r + ® +b)HH00 ¡ 2H(H0)2
H3
(1¡ t)F00 > 0:









D: Proof of Proposition 2




















































































@® > 0. With @w
@® > 0 and @¾
@® > 0, the falling level of productive employment
can immediately be seen from the labor demand equation (9).
Note that (28), characterizing the optimum monitoring intensity, is una¤ected by a
variation in the tax rate as long as the job acquisition rate ® is …xed. Hence, we have
19@¾
@t = 0. Recalling theno-shirkingcondition(12), this implies a constant net wage(1¡t)w
and an increasing gross wage w. With an unchanged monitoring intensity ¾ and a rising
wage w, total employment is reduced according to the input rule (9). ¤
E: Proof of Proposition 3













where ¢ = f1¾f2L¡f2¾f1L > 0 is immediate from the condition for the equilibrium to be
stable. Evaluating the numerators leads to
f1¾ = (1¡ t)LF
00 + F











f1L = ¡(1 ¡ t)(1 ¡ ¾)F
00 ¡ F
0(w + m)





















f2L = (1¡ ¾)2(1¡ t)F00 (44)
+(1¡ ¾)F0(w + m)




The inequality f2L · 0 has to hold in any stable equilibrium. Further, combining the









= sgn[w + e ¡ eu] > 0: (45)
20Thus, we arrive at f1L > 0.
Noting that the no-shirking condition holds with equality, combining (5) and (8) yields










F: Change of productive employment
Productive employment evolves according to
@(1 ¡ ¾)L
@eu
































It can be demonstrated that the sign of the last expression is ambiguous. First, notice
that jH00j can be arbitrarily high at the equilibrium. In this case, the last term dominates
the second one, and we arrive at @(1¡ ¾)L
@eu
> 0:
Substituting (18) into (17) yields
¡(1¡ t)F 0 +
H0
H
[(1¡ ¾)F0(1 ¡t) ¡ (w + e¡ eu)] = 0: (49)
Consider a situation in which w ! 0, m = 0; and eu ! e. It follows that H0=H !
1=(1¡¾). If, in addition, r ! 0 and H00 ! 0 at the equilibrium, we obtain @(1¡ ¾)L
@eu
< 0
if L=(N ¡ L) > 2. The latter condition is equivalent to having an unemployment rate of
(N¡L)=N < 1=3. Hence, given this speci…cation, an unexpected reduction in productive
employment turns out for any reasonable value of the unemployment rate.
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